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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RAEDEL E. ASHLEY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.
GARY MONTGOMERY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JOHN DOE 1-5, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents,
GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a
Intervenor,
corporation,

Case No.
12123

GARY MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A. B. COOPER, dba KEARNS
LG.A. FOODLINER, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
1

NATURE OF CASE
These are actions brought to enjoin alleged violations of the "Common Day of Rest Act" (Chapter 25,
Laws of Utah, 1970). The action by Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., against a number of drug stores (No. 192780)
seeks damages as well as a permanent injunction against
defendants' remaining open on Sunday and selling certain items in alleged violation of the Act. The action by
Gary Montgomery and other University of Utah students against various markets (No. 192886) seeks to enjoin the defendants from remaining open on Sundays
and selling articles in alleged violation of the Act. The
action by Gary Montgomery against several stores (No.
192948) seeks the same relief.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Some defendants filed motions to dismiss, others
answered and moved for summary judgment. After
consolidating the actions for the purpose of determining
questions of constitutionality, the trial court requested
written memorandums in support of the parties' respective positions. Such memorandums were submitted prior
to the date of the hearing, and a stipulation of facts was
submitted on the date of the hearing. At a day-long hearing, on the motions, all interested parties were heard. The
parties stipulated in open court that the matter was ripe
for determination of the constitutional questions. (The
stipulation was supposed to have been read into the rec2

ord, but the reporter left the state, and reporter's notes
covering the hearing or reporting the stipulation have
not been found.)
On May 12, 1970, Judge Elton read from the bench
his decision that the Common Day of Rest Act was "in
its entirety" in violation of the Utah Constitution. Defendants' various motions for dismissal and for summary
judgment were granted and the complaints ordered dismissed (R. 187). Judge Elton died the next day before
signing a written order. On May 18, 1970, an order was
signed by Judge Faux granting the various motions of
defendants and dismissing the actions (R. 190-193).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment declaring the Common Day of Rest Act to be in violation
of the Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts, as they relate to questions of
constitutionality, are not generally in dispute. By a stipulation of facts entered into between the plaintiffs and
most of the defendants in the three actions, the parties
agreed that if a party were called as a witness he, or his
representative, would testify to the matters stated therein (R. 171). The stipulation relates to facts existing at
the time it was filed.
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Plaintiff Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., is a corporation operating large department-type drug stores in
Utah and elsewhere. It sells a great variety of items, including prescription and other drugs, and customarily
stayed open on Sundays at most of its stores. On Sunday, April 5, 1970, the first Sunday on which the Common Day of Rest Act was in effect, its employees
shopped at various drug stores in Salt Lake County. The
stores named in the complaint were open for business
and sold several items to Skaggs' employees (R. 171172).

The individual plaintiffs are students at the University of Utah and on April 5, 1970, shopped at stores
named in their complaint. The stores were open for business and plaintiffs purchased the articles stated in their
complaints. None of the defendants had filed a notice of
intent to cease doing business on Saturdays. The defendants are all individuals or corporations operating retail
stores of various types in Salt Lake County ( R. 172) .
Defendants Prescription Pharmacy and Lowes'
Pharmacy operate prescription-type drug stores in Salt
Lake City, which do not sell the variety of items that
many large drug stores do, but carry some items other
than prescription-type drugs. The stores have customarily operated seven days a week (one for 24 hours a day)
and stayed open on Sundays after the effective date of
the Act, selling everything except certain notions and
cosmetic-type items. All other items they considered
exempt under the Act ( R. 173) .
4

Defendant Raedell Ashley, dba Mount Air Pharmacy, operates a drug store engaged in the sale of prescription drugs, as well as proprietary drugs and medicines. In addition she sells health, sick room and medical
preparations and supplies, infants' necessities, toiletries,
cosmetics, sundries, film, and tobacco products, and operates a newsstand, card rack and soda fountain. The
drug store stayed open for business seven days a week
until the effective date of the Act, after which it stayed
open on Sundays on a limited basis (R. 174).
Defendant Allied Development Company, Inc., operates a suburban-type department store in Murray. The
store sells such items as hardware, clothing, paints, seeds
and nursery items, sporting goods, hunting and fishing
equipment, fencing, home repair and building materials
and automotive supplies. Both before and after the effective date of the Act it stayed open for business on Saturdays and Sundays for the sale of all items carried by
it. It does over 35% of its weekly business on Saturday
and Sunday (R. 174-175).
Defendant Emily A. Beaver, dba Beaver Grocery,
operates a small family-type grocery store in Salt Lake
City. She has several employees and sells primarily grocery items and some meats. She cannot compete with the
large supermarkets generally, thus a good portion of her
business has been small sales of last-minute forgotten and
emergency items. She customarily operated the store on
a seven-day week, 24-hour basis and continued to do so
after the effective date of the Act (R. 175).
5

Defendant Harmon Shopping Center, Inc., operates a retail store in Salt Lake County. Its principal
business is groceries, including meats, but it also operates
a pharmacy and sells many other items including dry
goods, clothing, sporting goods, hardware, cosmetics and
the like. For many years it has been open every day including Sundays and holidays for about twelve hours a
day. It continued such operation after the effective date
of the Act (R. 175-176).
Defendant Miniature Market Enterprises, Inc., operates several small markets in Salt Lake County and
has been continuously in operation since 1952. Since 1958
its stores have never closed. They sell grocery items,
sandwiches and other food stuffs, consumed in part by
its customers on the premises, and sundries and drug
items which do not require the services of a pharmacist.
After the effective date of the Act its stores remained
open for the limited purpose of selling items it deemed
·to be exempt under the Act (R. 176).
Defendant Blae Hansen, dba Blae' s Quality Foods,
operates a grocery store in Salt Lake City, which for
many years has stayed open every day of the year, approximately 18 hours a day. He sells, in addition to grocery items, sundries and drug items which do not require
the services of a pharmacist (R. 176).
Defendant George R. Smith, dba K wikee Market,
operates two small grocery stores in Salt Lake City. In
addition to groceries and some meats and produce, he
sells sundries and notions, drug items, candy, tobacco,
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beverages, and sandwiches which are often consumed on
the premises. He has customarily been open on a 7-day
week basis for about 16 hours a day. Since the effective
date of the Act, he has remained open Sundays for the
sale of all items, but has limited sales on Saturdays to
items he considered exempt under the Act ( R. 177) .
Defendant The Southland Corporation, dba 7Eleven Food Stores, Inc., operates small convenience
food stores in Utah and other states. It has about 50
stores in Utah. Convenience stores are small neighborhood grocery and dairy stores characterized by fast 7<lay a week service and long daily hours. Convenience
stores are entirely different from regular grocery stores
both in organization and operation and the needs they
The average sale in a convenience store is much
less than the average sale at a supermarket. A convenience store is operated to provide convenient daily shopping hours and convenient shopping days, Sunday and
holidays, when supermarkets are closed or a customer
needs to obtain a few forgotten or emergency items; to
provide convenient shopping locations and to provide
convenient services such as parking at the door with
quick in and out service. Such stores cannot generally
operate economically on a six-day week. In Utah they
do approximately 25% of their total business on Sunday,
much greater than that done by supermarkets on Sunday. Most could not withstand this loss and remain on a
profitable operating basis.
In Utah, the 7-Eleven Stores sell grocery items (in
small variety), ice, firewood, beverages, ice cream, can7

dy, confections, tobacco, non-prescription drugs, notions
and sundries, packaged meats, magazines, greeting
cards and other items. They actively promote and sell
picnic food and supplies which constitute a substantial
portion of their Sunday business during summer months.
Since the effective date of the Act its stores have remained open on Sundays selling items which it deems
exempt under the Act ( R. 177 -179) .
Defendant Ward Market is a family-owned corporation operating one market in Salt Lake City. It is
operated by the family and several other employees and
has stayed open continuously seven days a week, 24
hours a day. It sells groceries, produce and packaged
meats and could not survive by closing on either Saturday or Sunday, as it does in excess of 35 % of its total
weekly business on these two days, and operates on a
small profit margin. Since the efective date of the Act it
has stayed open on Sundays for the sale of all items and
has limited its sale on Saturdays to items it feels are
exempt under the Act ( R. 179) .
Defendant A. B. Cooper, dba Kearns IGA Foodliner, and defendant L. B. Grainger, dba Grainger's
IGA Foodliner, each operate independently owned
neighborhood markets selling a complete line of grocery
items, meats, non-prescription drugs, toiletries, beverages, tobaccos, sundries and the like. These stores are
managed by their owners, but employ a number of other
persons. They have been open seven days a week approximately 12 hours a day. Increased competition from large
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supermarkets has forced neighborhood markets such as
these to remain open seven days a week for long hours.
They offer a public service distinct from that offered by
convenience stores because of their larger line of groceries and related commodities. Since the effective date
of the Act they have been open on Sundays, but selling
only items they deem to be exempt under the Act ( R.
179-180).

Defendant Grand Central Drugs, Inc., operates
several large suburban-type department stores and drug
stores within the state. The stores have generally stayed
open seven days a week, 12 hours a day. They sell preand non-prescription drugs and medical supplies, plus a great variety of other items including cosmetics, hardware, tools, automotive supplies, toys, clothing, home decorations, repair items, appliances, electrical and plumbing supplies, household utensils, tobacco,
housewares, pet supplies, candies, magazines, cameras
and sporting goods, picnic supplies, school supplies,
shoes and the like. Some of the stores operate snack bars.
Since the effective date of the Act its stores in Utah have
been closed on Sundays.
After the effective date of the Act, it caused its employees to make a survey of Salt Lake County and found
that almost every item could be purchased on Sunday
which could have been purchased on that day prior to
the effective date of the Act. Some items were purchased
from stores which had filed a notice of intent to remain
closed on Saturday. They found that certain types of
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outlets which appear to be exempted by the Act were
selling goods that other businesses may be prohibited
from selling on Sunday. For example there were service
stations selling bread, milk, canned goods, hardware
items, tools and clothing. Many of these items were sold
by them prior to the effective date of the Act. Golf pro
shops were selling golf clubs, golf bags and other equipment such as shoes, shirts, pants, socks and other articles
of clothing. Shops at ski resorts were selling skis, poles,
and other ski equipment plus a large assortment of ski
and other clothing. Motels operating gift shops or gift
counters and shops operated in Salt Lake International
Airport were selling clothing, souvenirs, dishwares, brica-brac, toys, jewelry, and the like (R. 180-182).

ARGUMENT
I
THE COMMON DAY OF REST ACT IS DISCRIMINATORY, ARBITRARY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND UNIFORM OPERATION
OF LAW PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
Respondents are fully aware that decisions concerning the wisdom or desirability of Sunday closing generally are for the legislature and not the judiciary. This is
essentially true of all legislation and is not an issue requiring lengthy argument, such as that advanced by ap-
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pellants. Nonetheless, whether particular legislation is
desirable or undesirable, liked or unliked by a majority
of the people, it must meet certain constitutional standards before it can be upheld. Otherwise, the courts would
have little occasion to consider the validity of any legislative act.
Since the turn of the century, this court has ruled
upon the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances designed to make certain persons or businesses cease operations at designated times or days while allowing others
to continue to operate. In the three most recent cases,
the legislation was invalidated, primarily upon the
grounds that it was arbitrary, constituted special legislation, and lacked uniform application.
The earliest of the three cases is Saville v. Corless,
46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51 ( 1915), which involved a statute by which certain businesses in cities of over 10,000
population were required to close at 6:00 p.m. Drug
stores and stores dealing "exclusively in, or whose major
portion of stock consisted of foodstuffs, meats and other
provisions of a perishable nature" were regarded as public necessities and exempted. This court held the statute
unconstitutional upon three grounds. First, it violated
the constitutional right of a person to enjoy, acquire and
possess property ;1 second, it was arbitrary and constilThe present Act is also invalid on the same basis. In Golding v. Schubach
Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937), this court held that the rights
guaranteed by the property provision of Article I, Section 1, Utah Constitution
are invaded when one is not at the liberty to contract with others respecting the
use to which he may subject his property or use or employ his time.
In Ritzhold v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 702 (1956), this
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tuted special legislation in that it applied only to cities
having certain population and some stores were permitted to remain open and sell items prohibited to others;
and third, the businesses required to close could not, by
staying open, adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of the public. The court said (p. 52) :
"There are things the sale of which may be restricted, regulated, or even prohibited by the
Legislature, and enterprises which may be restricted, regulated and controlled. But such legal
interference must rest on the police power of the
state to promote or preserve public health, public
morals, public safety, public convenience, and
general welfare. The act here has no such purpose, and in no sense tends to promote or preserve
the public health, morals, peace, order, safety,
convenience, comfort or welfare. It is but an arbitrary and an unwarranted interference with a
merchant's business. One or a number of merchants may desire to close their stores at 6 o'clock.
They may do that. But they, by legislation, cannot compel every other merchant to close at the
same hour. They can run their own business, but
not their neighbor's. So employees, for motives of
their own, may desire all stores to close at a certain hour. But their employers', whose business
and property is affected, have a voice in that.
They, if they choose, may consent to close. But
they cannot, by legislation or otherwise be coerced to do so. An employee may ref use to work
for another after 6 o'clock. That is his right. But
court ruled that an ordinance prohibiting price advertising of eye glasses viol;ited
Article I, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution.
The present Act clearly imposes an unreasonable burden on the right of an
individual to dispose of his property and engage in a legitimate business enterprise.
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may not, by legislation or otherwise, prevent
his employer from conducting his own business
in person, or with other employees who are will:ing to work for him. That is an unwarranted interference with the rights of others. All this is so
self-evident and fundamental as not to admit of
argument."
Next, in Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140
P.2d 939 ( 1943), the court considered the constitutionality of a statute which generally prohibited businesses
from operating on Sunday, but excepted:
"* * *hotels, boarding houses, baths, restaurants,
taverns, livery stables, garages, automotive service stations, golf courses, bowling alleys, ball
parks, theatres, bathing resorts, ice stations, newsstands, skating rinks, confectionary stores, for the
sale of confections only, tobacco stores, for the
sale of tobacco, pharmacies, or the prescription
counters of retail drug stores * * * or such industries as are usually kept in continuous operation."
Noting that general Sunday closing laws were
often upheld as designed to protect society by establishing a compulsory day of rest, the court nevertheless held
that the exceptions to general closing were so unreasonable and arbitrary as to unconstitutionally discriminate
between persons similarly situated. The court so ruled
even after expressly recognizing principles argued by
appellants in the present case-that discrimination is
the essence of classification and that a court cannot substitute its judgment, as to the wisdom or policy of a law,
for that of the legislature. It pointed out that there are
generally three types of Sunday closing laws considered
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by the courts. The first, and one which has met with the
most success, exempts only the sale of certain commodities. The second prevents a particular business from operating on Sunday. The third exempts specified businesses and occupations. The court found that the statute
being dealt with was most closely akin to the third type,
although designed to make certain commodities available on Sundays.
The discriminatory classifications of the act as well
as the total breadth of the exemptions were considered.
The recreational exemptions, it was found, discriminated
between persons or firms similarly situated in that confectionaries were permitted to sell soft drinks while grocery stores could not, and ice cream parlors could fit as
readily as confectionary stores into the recreational
scheme. The court held the statute unconstitutional, noting (p. 946):
"The exceptions in the Utah Sunday closing
statute are so broad that they in effect change
the nature of this act from a general closing law,
with exceptions, to a law aimed, without sufficient legal reason, at certain classes of businesses
with a _general exception to other classes which in
effect is a grant of a special privilege to the excepted class, while, without legal excuse, denying them to others."

Broadbent appears to have overruled, sub silentio
the case of State v. Sopher, 53 Utah 318, 71 Pac. 482
( 1903), the only one by this court in which Sunday closing legislation was upheld. The two cases involved the
same statute, although there had been an amendment
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making some additions to the businesses exempted. A
comparison of the two cases compels a conclusion that
the additions did not account for the different result.
ln Sopher much emphasis was placed upon the need
to prevent exploitation of employees and their requirement for one day a week rest. Socio-economic conditions
have changed completely, however, since 1903. Labor
protection laws, such as the 40-hour, five-day week, and
the strength of labor unions make such laws unnecessary
and reduce the relevance of the court's 1903 fmding (p.
485):
"Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are
upheld, not from any right of the government to
legislate for the promot10n of rellgious observances, but from its right to protect all persons
from the physical and moral debasement which
comes from uninterrupted labor."
The court's most recent Sunday Closing decision is
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d
464 ( 1948) , in which a Salt Lake City ordinance prohibiting Sunday sales generally, but excepting specified
commodities, was reclared unconstitutional. Again the
court addressed itself not only to the question of whether
the statute was discriminatory but whether, in light of
its declared objects and purposes and the scope of its
exemptions, the ordinance was adapted to accomplish
legitimate objects under the police power. The court
quoted with approval from State v. Mason, 94 Utah 50,
78 P.2d 920 (p. 923):
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"In order to see whether the excluded classes or
transactions are on a different basis than those
included, we must look at the purpose of the act.
The objects and purposes of a law present the
touchstone for determining proper and improper
classifications."
The court observed that the ordinance was not a
general Sunday closing law, but one prohibiting certain
activities only, and voiced its inability to conceive how
the health, safety, morals, peace or good order of the
citizens of Salt Lake City would be promoted by prohibiting "in effect the working of a salesman or saleswoman on Sunday while permitting the employment of
common laborers, artisans, stenographers, and laundresses."
Significantly, the court recognized that discrimination is not limited to verbal classifications but may be
based upon its practical effects on the operations of various businesses (p. 467) :
"\Ve are not advised that the work of a seller of
haberdashery is so much more arduous than that
of a ditch digger as to require that the law protect
the former and not the latter from the possibility
of being employed seven days a week. \Vhile the
ordinance does not expressly prohibit the carrying on of businesses of a particular type, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that its necessary
effect is to do so. A clothing,
or jewelry store does not engage in selling any of the excepted products, nor would it be economically
feasible for a large grocery or vegetable store to
open its doors on Sunday for the sale of milk, tobacco and candy. As thus viewed and as gauged
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by the grant of municipal power hereinabove re-

f erred to, we find the prohibitions of the ordi-

nance bear no reasonable relationship to the objectives to be accomplished by enactments made
pursuant to such grant. Of this ordinance, can it
be said that there is 'no fair reason for the law
that would not require with equal force its extension to others which it leaves untouched?' " [Emphasis added.]

The need to look beyond verbal classifications to determine a statute's practical effect on business operations
was recognized by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
,Skag-way Department Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha,
140N.W.2d28(Neb.,1966). The court, in invalidating
a general Sunday closing law, stated (p. 31) :
"Changes in the economic order have brought
new problems. The grocery, the meat market,
and the drug store that sold only merchandise
which their names implied are fast giving way
to the department store, the chain store, and the
supermarket. The classification of stores in accordance with commodities sold no longer provides a proper method of classification because
the department store, chain store, and supermarket generally include all of the goods formerly sold only in the 'community store.' * * *
"We reaffirm our previous holding that Sunday
closing laws may be proper subjects of legislation. But their validity is dependent upon reasonable classification for purposes of legislation. A
portion of a class may not be legislated against
unless there are reasonable distinctions
warrant it to be treated as a class for purposes of legislation. * * * While it is true that our earlier
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cases upheld classifications to which Sunday closing law was applied it was under conditions then
existing that avoided unfair discriminations. Because of the economic changes that have come
about, particularly in the busmess retail field, the
basis of former classification has disappeared.
This poses a complex problem for legislative
bodies and requires reconsideration by the courts
in view of the changed conditions."
Nebraska has on several other recent occasions invalidated Sunday closing laws because of their discriminatory features. See for example, Skag-way Department Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 176 N eh. 169,
125 N.W.2d 529 (1964), and Terry Carpenter, Inc. v.
Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
A county Sunday closing ordinance was struck
down by the Washington Supreme Court in County of
Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d
993 ( 1966). In holding the ordinances' s classifications to be arbitrary and unreasonable, the court noted
that legislatures do not have the same plenary power of
classification under the police power that they do in
some other areas, such as taxation. The ordinance could
not be regarded as designed to affect public peace,
health, safety, morals or welfare because of the great
number of exemptions included in it. By citing N ebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940
(1934), the individual appellants would have the court
treat Sunday closing legislation enacted under the police
power as coming within the latter category. The ValuMart case more properly recognized such legislation as
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concerning what appellants denominate "fundamental
personal rights."

In Nation v. Giant Drug Company, 396 P.2d 431

(Wyo., 1964), a Sunday closing ordinance of the City
of Cheyenne was held invalid by the Supreme Court of
\Vyoming. The court found it difficult to understand the
basis of legislative classifications ostensibly enacted for
purposes of advancing general welfare aims set forth in
the ordinance, "in light of other pursuits which [were}
left untouched such as construction works, manufacturing, processing, laundries, dry cleaning establishments,
other types of business rendering services, and all types
of mechanical and artisan labor."
Applying the rationale of the above cases, and particularly those decided by this court, it is apparent that
the Common Day of Rest Act is unconstitutionally discriminatory in many respects. The most obvious discrimination arises from the exemptions provided in Section
5, a hodge-podge consisting of commodity exemptions, institutional exemptions and hybrids. It is permissible to sell goods or render services essential or incidental to operations which are customarily continuous,
"such as airlines, railroads, taxi cabs, bus lines, or other
transportation facilities." But it is well known (and set
forth in the stipulation of facts) that railroad stations,
Lus terminals and airports have shops selling many items
generally carried by other businesses which would have
to close and which could not sell them on Sunday.
Also exempted is the sale of "supplies or services
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customarily provided by automotive service stations."
Many service stations have for years sold grocery items,
hardware, tools, sundries, and with the advent of the
interstate highway system, even clothing. Moreover, oils,
lubricants, polishes, waxes, and many other automotive
accessories constitute a significant part of the business of
department stores, discount stores and large drug stores.
Under the act, service stations presumably could remain
open and sell these items while other stores could not.
Among the exemptions to the act is "the sale of
goods or rendering of services normally associated with
or incidental to the operation of recreation, education or
entertainment facilities." While it appears under this
exemption that beverages, tobacco, and "confections'
may be sold by anyone, theatres, resorts, golf courses,
"tourist attractions" and the like may remain open and
sell all items normally associated with their operations.
This would include a great variety of articles which other
stores are prohibited from selling.
Only a few examples of discriminatory results have
been cited. Obviously many others could be found, and
not necessarily in the merchandising field alone. Section
5 (2), for example, exempts "the extraction or processing of natural resources." What reasonable basis is there
for excluding manufacturers or processors of natural resources when other manufacturers, except those whose
process require continuous operations, are not exempt?
Arbitrary classifications with respect to persons
who may sell and commodities which may be sold are
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not the only areas of discrimination. The act contains an
unjustifiable two-edged discrimination against those
who elect to remain open on Sunday by closing on Saturday. Persons who "observe Saturday as the sabbath"
are not given the same privilege as those who either observe Sunday as the sabbath or desire to remain open
on Saturdays. Persons who elect to close on Saturday
must cease all business on that day in order to be able to
sell on Sunday. On the other hand, those who stay open
on Saturday can, if they desire, sell selected items on
Sunday. A similar provision was held unconstitutionally discriminatory in Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood,
177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964), where the Nebraska Supreme Court said:
"L. B. 710 also requires businesses observing Saturday as the sabbath to close and keep closed on
Saturday if they wish to open on Sunday. The
discrimination appears when we realize that Saturday Sabbatarians are not permitted to sell the
excepted articles and commodities while all other
businesses covered by the act may sell the excepted goods on Sunday. The discrimination is so obvious it requires no further discussion."
Discrimination and arbitrariness are also apparent
in another aspect of the provision. Persons who desire to
close on Saturday and remain open on Sunday can do so
only if they "neither conduct nor require the conducting
by others of any business or labor for profit on Saturday
either by themselves or through firms or corporations under their ownership or control." This is not related to the
number of outlets, size of businesses, size of stores, or
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types of activities or businesses which may be under common ownership or control. To the extent that it requires
a person or corporation having multiple or varied businesses to close all or none on Saturday, the provision is
discriminatory and has no reasonable relationship to the
objects and purposes of the Act. A person operating
both a restaurant and a nursery, for example, would have
to close them both on Saturday if he wanted to operate
the nursery on Sunday. Other restaurants can remain
open seven days a week.
The Act violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution in an additional and unique way. Under
Section 6, it provides:

"* * * any person or county attorney may apply
to any court of competent jurisdiction for, and
may obtain an injunction restraining this violation." [Emphasis added.]
Since this court has held that there can be no unreasonable discrimination in the application or operation
of a law, the constitutionality of the Act may depend
upon whether it can be uniformly enforced. But by its
very nature, enforcement of the present Act cannot be
uniform.
Since any person or any county attorney may or
may not bring an action to enjoin an alleged violation of
the Act, in any given county, the county attorney or private individuals are permitted to discriminate between
the businesses that will be subject to suits. Even if the
intention of the county attorney or citizens was to close

22

all businesses operating in violation of the Act by bringing suits for injunction, if in fact some businesses were
closed before all were required to, serious discrimination
and lack of uniform operation would result.
Additionally, unless all county attorneys or citizens
in every county brought suit against the businesses that
remained open, making non-exempt sales, there would
be discrimination in enforcement as between the various
counties and lack of uniform operation, a result condemned by this court in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra.
The various suits brought in the present matter,
raise another interesting question. Plaintiff Skaggs in its
suit sought damages, whereas the individual plaintiff.:1
did not. If the county attorney were to bring action he
1. ould have no grounds for damages. Thus there is discrimination provided for in the Act not based on the act
of defendants, but upon who happens to be the plaintiff.
All appellants rely heavily upon the 1961 Sunday
closing cases 2 decided by the United States Supreme
Court. Recognizing these cases as not controlling, they
cite them as "highly persuasive, if not authoritative."
But they are not as persuasive as appellants contend.
The earlier Utah cases, under the doctrine of stare deci5is, and on the basis of reason, are entitled to far greater consideration. The United States Supreme Court was
I

2McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L. Ed.2d 393, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101
( 1961) · Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGin/ey, 366 U.S. 582, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 551, 81 Sup. Ct. 1135 (1961), rehearing denied 368 U.S. 869, 7 L. Ed.2d
69, 82 Sup. Ct. 1; Brarmfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L. Ed.2d 563, 81 Sup.
Ct. 1144 ( 1961); and Gallagher v. Crown-Kosher Supermarket, 366 U.S. 617, 6
L. Ed.2d 536, 81 Sup. Ct. 1122 (1961).
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deciding only whether the statutes offended any federal
constitutional provisions, and was not concerned with
state law. Appellants argue that there is basically no
difference between the equal protection provision of the
federal constitution and the uniform operation of laws
provision of the Utah Constitution. The two provisions
often are similarly interpreted, but there are areas where
different results would be reached. The language ''all
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation,"
is narrower in scope but more specific in meaning than
the wording of the 14th Amendment.
Appellants' argument that Utah cases have not expressed any difference between federal and state tests
for equality or uniformity has little significance inasmuch as there have been few if any cases in which it has
been necessary to raise such an issue. .Moreover, this
court is just as competent and as free to decide these
questions as is the United States Supreme Court.
The cases cited are unpersuasive for another reason.
In them the United States Supreme Court (perhaps
uncharacteristically) took a hands-off attitude, indicating that such legislation was a matter for the states, not
a federal problem. The opinions, including the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, evidence a feeling
that the desirability of Sunday closing should be left to
state legislatures and their validity to state courts. 'Vhile
some state courts have since placed some reliance on
these cases, others have regarded them lightly and refused to close their eyes to obvious discriminations.
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Appellants cannot legitimately distinguish the
Broadbent and Gronlund cases, so they have attempted
to lessen their effect by focusing on isolated passages
and ignoring what the cases held. Actually, despite a
more definite approach, the effect of the legislation involved in these two cases and the present Act is very similar. The language in Broadbent appearing at page 14,
supra., and the language from Gronlund at page 16,
supra., can with little change be applied equally to the
Common Day of Rest Act.
The individual appellants note that to be upheld
Sunday closing must prohibit the performance of labor
and gainful occupations generally rather than merely retail selling. However, the thrust of the present act is almost entirely at retail selling. The largest employers in
the state such as Kennecott Copper, Geneva Steel, the
railroads, and government agencies are free to work as
they will. Appellants' assertion that a number of cases
from other jurisdictions invalidated Sunday Closing legislation only because general closing was not provided
for, misses the mark. The legislation in those cases was
as general as that involved here, but the courts recognized that the myriad exceptions prevented the legislation from having a general effect. Respondents disagree
that "it is of little use to point out the discrimination in
permitting a tavern to sell beer while a grocery store next
door cannot sell orange juice." Unless a real basis for
such discrimination can be demonstrated (and this appellants have not done) the legislation should not be upheld.
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II
THE COMMON DAY OF REST ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND INDEFINITE, AND DOES NOT
CONTAIN ADEQUATE STANDARDS.
Appellants seem to agree that the Act is vague and
indefinite, but argue that since there are no criminal
sanctions, as such, we can overlook the fact that the people of ordinary intelligence must guess at the meaning
of various provisions of the Act and that there will be
wide differences of opinion concerning its application.
It is true that the courts more closely scrutinize
criminal statutes with regard to the question of vagueness. But that does not mean that civil statutes (assuming the act is entirely a civil statute) can be so vague and
indefinite that the legislature, in effect, delegates its responsibilities to the courts.

On a number of occasions, courts have invalidated
Sunday closing laws on the basis of vagueness. For example, in State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365
(1962) the Kansas Supreme Court upset a statute excepting "the sale of any drugs or medicines, provisions,
or other articles of immediate necessity" in the following
language (p. 373) :
"While the line of demarcation between the valid
exercise of police power and constitutional guarantees is not always well defined, and courts must
accord to the legislature a wide range of power to
classify and delineate in declaring the public
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policy of the state, we cannot consent to the legislative invasion of constitutional guarantees to
the extent here evidenced. Although the sale of
goods on Sunday constituted an offense under
the common law, and it is well settled that not
every uncertainty which may exist in the operation or application of a criminal statute renders
it void. (State v. Ashton, supra.) nonetheless, we
are of the opinion the statute here considered
( G.S. 1949, 21-955 and 21-956) is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it fails to inform men
of common intelligence what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties; that
they must guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. * * *"
In G.I. Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C.
206, 125 S.E.2d 764 ( 1962) the statute excluded "novelties, toys, souvenirs, and articles necessary for making
repairs and performing services." The court found the
statute unconstitutionally vague, uncertain and indefinite and in violation of the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Harvey v. Priest,
366 S. W .2d 324 ( 1963) , overruled a prior decision in
which it had rejected a claim that the Sunday closing act
was void for vagueness. The court said (p. 328) :
"In the light of the history and background of
these sections, and taking judicial notice of the
matters hereinabove mentioned, upon what we
deem to be an objective reappraisal of our views
as formally expressed, we have concluded, and
accordingly hold that the presence of the phrase
'or other articles of immediate necessity' renders
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the statutory scheme of Sunday closing (as embodied within the two sections here under scrutiny) so vague and indefinite that it cannot be
ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty what sales are permitted, and what sales
are interdicted, thus making the statute incapable
of rational enforcement and hence void."
Admittedly, the foregoing cases involved statutes
having specific criminal penalties. However, the test applied in each, differs little from that applied by this court
in determining whether a civil statute is unconstitutionally vague. Thus in J(ent v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305
P.2d 870 (1957) the contention had been made that a
statute providing for the chartering of social clubs and
seting up regulations for the storage and consumption
of liquor was invalid on the ground of vagueness. The
language in that case was quite specific, except that the
act in several instances referred to such things as "reasonable" initiation fees, "reasonable" regulations, and
"strict" regulations. Rejecting the claim of vagueness,
the court applied the following test (p. 87 4) :
"If the statute is so designed that persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding,
can tell what their conduct must be to conform to
its requirements and is susceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those charged
with responsibility of enforcing it, it is invulnerable to an attack of vagueness."

The court did point out that it was important to
note that this was not a criminal statute, but it did not
dilute the test to be applied. Moreover, in Toronto v.
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Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P.2d 594 (1950) this court
held unconstitutional a statute which barred actions for
recovery of real estate sold for delinquent taxes after
four years. In a concurring opinion Justice Wolfe stated
(p. 600):
"I believe as does Mr. Justice Latimer that (the
statute) is inQPerative because the act is indefinite, uncertain, inconsistent, muddled and confused and does not lend itself to intelligible or
workable interpretation within the bounds of construction."
"In the enactment of a statute reasonable precision is required. Certainty need not be absolute
and the court should not invalidate legislative
acts because they are inaccurately drawn or because the expressions used are awkward, clumsy
or wanting in precision. However, if uncertainty
and vagueness cannot be removed, or if removed,
the legislative intent is still unascertainable, then
the act should be declared void and inoperative.

* * *

'In the enactment of statutes reasonable precision is required. Indeed one of the prime
requisites of any statute is certainty, and legislative enactments may be declared by the courts
to be inoperative and void for uncertainty in
the meaning thereof. This power may be exercised where the statute is so incomplete, or so
irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague and indefinite, that the statute cannot be executed
and the court is unable, by the application of
known and accepted rules of construction, to
determine what the legislature intended, with
any reasonable degree of certainty. * * *'"
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The case of Henry v. Rocky ]}fountain Packing
Corp., 113 Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487 ( 1948), on rehearing 113 Utah 444, 202 P.2d 727 ( 1949), has
no bearing on this issue. The court merely held on petition for rehearing that penal statutes are to be more
strictly construed than non-penal statutes. (In this regard it is interesting to note that the Common Day of
Rest Act appears in the Penal Code in Laws of Utah,
1970.)
The individual appellants cite several earlier decisions of this court for the propositions ( l) that it is the
duty of the court to give effect to the intent of the legislature; ( 2) a statute should not be stricken down or applied contrary to its literal meaning, except where it is
so vague that the meaning of the legislature cannot be
ascertained. The propositions are conceeded but they do
not assist appellants here. First, it is clear that statutes
other than criminal may be invalidated on the basis of
vagueness ;3 second, respondents would defy anyone to
explain to this court what the legislature meant by much
of Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 (I), for example, exempts:
"The sale of goods or rendering of services necessary to the maintenance of health, safety or life,
such as, by way of example, and not by way of
limitation, medical or hospital goods or services
or prescription medicine."
3See two recent decisions of this court where non-criminal statutes were invalidated on the basis of vagueness; Great Sait Lake A111hority v. Island Ranching
Company, 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), and Jones v. Logan City
Corporation, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967).

30

Using dictionary definitions of "health," "safety,"
and "life," an untold number of commodities or services
could, under varying circumstances, be held necessary
for their maintenance and thus exempt. If the Act is upheld, this exemption alone could keep the courts busy
for many years determining whether a business violated
the Act and was subject to injunction. Since the injunction presumably would proscribe only the sale of the contested items, it is conceivable that thousands of items in
each store could be litigated, and since the examples are
not "by way of limitation," there is no basis for application of the rule of ejusdem generis.
One commodity almost everyone would consider
necessary for the maintenance of health and life is food.
Is the sale of groceries exempt under the Act? The Governor of the state suggested that they would be. The Attorney General, in his opinion to the Governor, held that
they would not. In their brief the individual appellants
point out just how unclear the meaning of the legislature
is and underscore the tremendous burden that will be
placed on the courts in determining what items or activities are or are not exempt. 4
4At page 19 of individual appellants' brief they state:
"The examples for each kind of exception are listed only by way of example
and not by way of limitation. Thus, any service or commodity that fits the
not its is spec.ifically
type of exemption indicated will be exempt, wh.ether
included. This feature of the Act promotes fairness m that the Legislature
has made no attempt to determine definitively all the conceivable varieties,
products or services that may be, for examp!e, 'essential to .travel b.y perso_ns
within or through the State,' ( § 5 (3) ) or normally associated with or mdental to the operation of recreational, educational or entertainment facilities.' (§5(4) )."
The exemption for the sale of goods or
of seryices
to
travel by persons within or through the state raises an. mterestmg quest10n pertinent to both the discrimination and vagueness questions. At the present day,
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Subsections ( 3) and ( 4) of Section 5, and to a
lesser extent Subsection ( 2), raise two distinct questions. First, what stores are permitted to operate, and
second, what goods may be sold on the "common day
of rest." In these subsections, exemptions are provided
for the sale of certain kinds of goods. Taken alone, this
exemption might mean that any store could sell the
exempt goods. However, in each of these subsections
the "sale of goods" exemption is qualified by a phrase
such as "essential", "incidental", or "normally associated with". These qualifiers may impose a meaning
upon the subsections that the exempted goods are only
those sold in the exempted facilities and operations.
Thus, may hardware stores sell newspapers, periodicals
and the like or do recreational educational or entertainment facilities have the exclusive right to sell these
goods on Sunday? And under the same subsection, are
"beverages, tobacco products and confections" some of
the examples of goods normally associated with or incidental to the operation of recreational, educational or
entertainment facilities or are they in a separate category? The punctuation would appear to indicate that
the latter construction is correct.
In addition, is "maintaining of theatres, resorts,
golf courses" and the like an example of such services
or a separate category. The thrust of these ambiguities
falls most heavily on organizations which are not speuntold numbers of people are traveling on trips and vacations by camper truck
or trailer cooking and eating their meals in their mobile accommodations. May
grocery stores stay open for the purpose of selling groceries to these persons,
even though they might not be able to do so generally?
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cifically exempted, but which sell goods conceivably
permitted by the statute.
The second problem relates to the kinds of goods
that may be sold. Appellants say that the act is strictly
one providing for commodity exemptions. But this is
far from clear, and ambiguity pervades all the exemptions. For example, Subsection ( 3) exempts "sales of
motor fuels and supplies or services customarily provided by automotive service stations." Does this allow
the sale only of items normally associated with the
maintenance and operation of automobiles or of all
items service stations have been accustomed to carrying
in the past? If the latter, may all stores stay open to
carry these items or service stations only?
In Subsection ( 4), goods and services "normally
associated with or incidental to the operation of recreational, educational or entertainment facilities" are exempted. Here the problem of what may be sold is even
more difficult. The phrase "normally associated" couples
two imprecise words, and the problems inherent in the
indefiniteness of the phrase are compounded by the
broadness of the classification of goods it attempts to
modify. Books, for example, would appear to be as
"normally associated" with educational facilities as
newspapers and periodicals. Thus, may bookstores
remain open? Nurseries and greenhouses sell goods associa ted with what many people regard as their chief
recreation. Should such facilities be allowed to remain
open or should the exemption be more narrowly in-
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terpreted along the lines of the Attorney General's
opinion?5
Under the same subsection "confections" are exempted. A confection, under many dictionary definitions,
is anything confected, and it appears that this is a
separate exemption, not necessarily an item normally
associated with or incidental to the operation of recreational, educational or entertainment facilities. Countless examples could be cited of questions raised by
ambiguities in the Act. But this does not seem necessary.
Anyone reading the Act and trying to relate his daily
activities to it could undoubtedly come up with more
questions. It is not just a matter of the legislature
failing to put everything in nice, neat pigeon holes. The
act is so laden with ambiguities, indefiniteness and
unanswered questions that it is almost impossible to
frame the questions.
Vagueness in the Act was purposely devised. This
appellants admit. The framers knew that an act without
exemptions would not be considered, but any degree
of specificity in setting out the exemptions would subject the Act to greater risk of being held arbitrary
and discriminatory. Thus, they couched the exemptions
in very vague and general language and then tried to
minimize the objection of vagueness by not providing
express criminal penalties. Respondents submit that
despite their attempted subtlety, the framers did not
5Jn his second opinion, given after the Act was passed, the Attorney Gen·
eral applied, in effect, the rule of ejusdem generis and held that the sale of gro·
ceries would not be exempt.
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accomplish their goals. The exemptions are still replete
with arbitrary and unreasonable categorization of both
commodity and institutional exemptions and the Act is
so vague and ambiguous it cannot be upheld even without criminal penalties.
III
THE COMMON DAY OF REST ACT REFLECTS SPECIAL RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
IN ITS PASSAGE AND THUS VIOLATES
CONTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
AND GUARANTYING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
As pointed out by appellant Skaggs in its brief,
the first Sunday closing laws had their origin in religious beliefs and for many years were sustained on religious grounds. This is no longer true. The highest
courts of the United States and many of the states have
made it clear that such laws, to be upheld, must be
based on a legitimate exercise of the police power. In
determining whether a Sunday closing law violates the
constitutional prohibition against laws providing for
religious freedom or prohibiting the establishment of
religion, the decisive factor is whether the law aids
religion or restricts freedom of religion under the guise
of setting aside a day of rest and recreation. McGowen
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 81 Sup. Ct.
1101 ( 1961).
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In justifying the Common Day of Rest Act, its
framers initially avoided religious matters, specifying
that its purpose was to provide a common day of diversion and relaxation on a day that had "come to have
special significance." After first purposing the Act on
a secular basis, the framers then proceeded directly
to draw religious motives into its enactment by providing that as an alternate, Saturday could be selected
to meet the statutory requirements of closure. In its
provision for this alternate day, the Act is substantially, if not wholly, grounded upon religious beliefs.
This is a direct "aid to religion" as it takes particular
notice of certain religious customs and makes special
allowance for them. (Section I of the Act) .
"***the legislature recognizes that some citizens
of the state observe Saturdays as the sabbath and
should not be unjustly affected by a common day
of rest act * * * it is deemed reasonable to eliminate the risk of such injustice by excepting from
the general operation of such an act those who do
not engage in their daily labors on Saturday."
The fact that the Act gives special treatment to
Saturday, on religious grounds, strongly suggests that
the actual reasons for Sunday being selected as the
"common day of rest" are also religious in nature.
There are many other groups and persons in this
state entitled to equal treatment under the law who
have religious tenets calling for observance of their
"sabbath" on days other than Saturday or Sunday.
Such groups and persons are unfairly and unconstitutionally affected by the Act, as are those who, because
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of their religious beliefs or lack of them, observe no
special day. The restrictive option of selection of either
Saturday or Sunday is unequal in its treatment of such
groups and individuals as it does not allow for further
exemption, exception or option based on the same logic
as the law's own Saturday exemption provision. This
discrimination violates not only the freedom and establishment of religion clauses of the United States and
Utah constitutions but also those providing for equal
protection and due process. Obviously, it is just as
unfair and unconstitutional to fail to consider or interfere with religious groups or persons who observe their
sabbath on days other than Saturday or Sunday as those
who observe Sunday. The right of man to worship as
his own individual conscience allows without dictation
or interference from the state, is fundamental and is a
right available to all. Had the Act limited itself to
the establishment of one common day of rest, it might
not have involved the issue of religion. However, the
expressed religious motives in the Saturday exemption
illustrate an attempt by the Act to foster religious beliefs
in an unconstitutional manner.
Individual appellants suggest that since the dissenting and specially concurring judges in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 6 L.Ed.2d 1398, 83 Sup. Ct.
1790 ( 1936) felt that Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, had
been overruled by that decision, a Sabbaterian exemption is required. The opinions do not hold or suggest
that at all, but only suggest that in Braunfeld the court
should have invalidated the Sunday closing legislation.
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In any event, Utah's constitutional provisions on
religious liberty and religious toleration are probably
stronger than any other state's. See Article I, Section
4, and Article III, Section I, Utah's Constitution. The
Act must be tested under these constitutional provisions, not only the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
IV
THE COMMON DAY OF REST VIOLATES
C 0 NS TIT UT I 0 NA L PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST SPECIAL LEGISLATION, CONSTITUTES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER, AND IS
NOT DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS
STATED PURPOSES.
Under Article VI, Section 26, of the Utah Constitution, the legislature is prohibited from enacting any
private or special laws:

* * *

"16. Granting to an individual, association or cor-

poration any privilege, immunity or franchise."
Section 26 further provides that:

"In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
Closely allied to the question of whether legislation
is discriminatory under equal protection or uniform
operation provisions is the question of whether it also
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discriminates because it constitutes special legislation.
'fhus, in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12
Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 974 (1961), this court invalidated legislation on the grounds that it violated not
only Sections 2 and 24 of Article I, but also Section
26 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution. The legislation in that matter imposed a penalty upon employers
who failed to pay wages to separated employees within
twenty-four hours from demand, but exempted, inter
alia, banks and mercantile houses. The court concluded
that there was no reasonable basis for excluding banks
and mercantile houses from the penalty provisions, and
that the Act therefore constituted class legislation.
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412,
375 P.2d 756 (1962), this court rejected several claims
of unconstitutionality, but held that Civic Auditorium
and Sports Arena Act of 1961 unconstitutional on the
basis that it constitutted special legislation, violating the
requirement that where a general law can be applicable
no special law shall be enacted. The holding of the
court was based upon the ground that the act provided
for a commission to operate auditoriums only in counties
having over 250,000 population.
See also Openshaw v. Hal fin, 24 Utah 420, 68 Pac.
138 (1902), Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac.
170 (1899).
The courts of many other states have held statutes
creating special privileges or disabilities invalid under
the special legislation prohibitions of their own consti-
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tutions. In Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.
2d 844 ( 1963), the court stated the test as follows
(p. 848):
"If [parties] are clearly within the general scope
and i:eason of the act, so that the provisions exempting them from its operation arbitrarily permit them to act in contravention of its terms and
purpose which are forbidden to the public at
large, there can be no doubt that the statute must
fail."
Additional cases so holding are Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W.306 (1902); Louisville &
N.R.R. Company v. Faulkner, 307 S.W.2d 196 (Ky.,
1957); and Harvey v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,
30 N.J. 381, 153 A.2d 10 (1959). The courts have also
held that the constitutional prohibition against special
legislation imposes a standard additional to the more
general requirement of equal protection of the law.
See, e.g., Sarner v. Union T.W.P., 151 A.2d 208, 55
N.J. Super. 528 (1959).
The prohibition against special legislation has been
applied by this court in connection with closing statutes.
In Saville v. Corless, supra., it said (p. 52):
"We also think the act special legislation. It only
applies to cities of 10,000 population or over.
Business houses or commercial establishments in
other cities and towns may keep open at all hours
of the day or night and sell anything not otherwise forbidden by law. The act further exempts
drugstores and commercial houses dealing exclusively in, or whose major portion of stock consists
of, foodstuffs, meats, and provisions of a perishable nature. Under the act, such establishments
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or houses can keep open and sell anything after
six o'clock * * * Clearly that is special legislation,
and the granting of privileges forbidden by the
Constitution."

;pc<1S'lr.'i

\S((.ct1(•n 1) is:

lk1''>

'* * * to promote weekly rest from the routine of
daily affairs * * * [while] permit[ing] conduct of

certain labor and the sale of certam goods and
services which are vital to the maintenance of
basic functions of the community or which are
necessary to the existence of facilities for diversion, recreation or relaxation."
In reviewing many of the numerous institutional
and commodity exemptions, however, it is difficult to
conceive of their relationship to the avowed purpose.
The Act, for example, excludes all activities of every
governmental agency regardless of how vital to maintenance of the basic functions of the community or how
necessary to the pursuit of recreation and relaxation.
It exempts all sales or services essential or even incidental to operations which are "customarily" continuous
without regard to the necessity for such continuous
operations. It exempts extraction or processing of
natural resources whether or not continuous operation
is required. This exclusion affects a substantial portion
of the state's labor force with no logical basis; there
is no reason why employees of many enterprises engaged
in the extraction and processing of natural resources
cannot stop and give their employees Sunday off as
easily as many other industries. Clearly this exclusion
has been made for the benefit of a special class, whose
opposition to the Act would otherwise have made its
passage impossible.
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In addition to the exemptions specifically granting
preferential status to certain businesses, there are other
exemptions which have the obvious effect of precluding
feasible operation of some businesses while permitting
the operation of others. This court in Gronlund v. Salt
Lake City,
made it known that it could not close
its eyes to the necessary effect of such exemption
provisions.
A distinct, but somewhat related, objection to the
Act is that it constitutes an unconstitutional exercise
of the police power. A state, like any branch of government, has limited powers, and acts which go beyond
the scope of its powers are ineffectual. It has long been
recognized that the police power of the state is limited
to measures which promote the public health, morals,
safety and the like. When a state attempts to adopt
arbitrary measures, having no relationship to these
police power objectives, they are void under the Federal
and state constitutions. The basic case expounding this
doctrine is Mugler v. Kans(lS, 123 U.S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct.
273 31 L.Ed. 205 ( 1887), by which prior decisions
declining to interfere with state measures allegedly
exceeding the police power were overruled. In its decision, the United States Supreme Court stated (p. 661):
"The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are
they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at
liberty-indeed, are under a strong duty-to look
at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to
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protect the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety, has no real or substantial relation
to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of
the courts to so adjudge and thereby give effect
to the Constitution."
This court has frequently followed the holding of
Mugler v. Kansas. It has been cited by the court so
often that the proposition is beyond challenge. See for
example, Sol Block & Griff v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387,
76 Pac. 22 (1904) and State v. Certain Intoxicatin,q
Liquors, 51 Utah 569, 172 Pac. 1050 ( 1918). The
principle was, in fact, applied by the court to invalidate
closing legislation in the Utah cases cited above. 6
In Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, supra., the court
said (p. 466) :
"The authority of a state to enact Sunday closing
laws is generally referable to the police power of
the state * * *
"Such being the case, the narrower question confronts us: Is the ordinance of Salt Lake City
adapted to accomplish the objects or some of them
for the accomplishment of which the power is
granted, or is it rather an arbitrary exercise of the
assumed grant of power and hence not within the
intendment of the legislative grant of power and
therefore violative of constitutional guarantees
against unreasonable discrimination?"
In answering the question and holding the ordinance
invalid, the court stated (p. 467) :
6Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51 (1915); Broadbent v. Gibson,
105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939 ( 1943); and Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah
284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
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"* * * we find the prohibitions of the ordinance
bear no reasonable relationship to the obiectives
to be accomplished by enactments made pursuant
to such grant. Of this ordinance, it can be said
that 'there is no fair reason for the law that would
not require with equal force its extension to others
which it leaves untouched.' "
Another class specifically granted special privileges
are those enterprises associated with recreation, such
as shops at resorts, ski lodges, golf courses and the like.
While it may be argued that one of the main purposes
of the Act is to promote rest and recreation, as stated by
this court in Gronlund v .Salt Lake City, supra., (p.
468):

"* * * even considering the desirability of promoting recreational activity on Sunday, no fair
reason suggests itself as to why their sale should
be permitted on Sunday while the sale of other
commodities is prohibited. Neither sporting
equipment nor nursery products are such from
the standpoint of the buyer or seller that they
cannot be purchased on a weekday, though it is
the intention of the buyer to use the equipment
and plant the tree or flowers on a Sunday.
Neither is likely to deteriorate over Saturday
night or be depleted during Sunday. Boxing
gloves and baseball bats are at least as staple as
butter and bananas."
As suggested by this court in Gronlund, cases dealing with the police power present an additional question.
Justice Straup in State v. Salt Lake Tribune Publishing, 68 Utah 187, 249 Pac. 47 4 ( 1926), cited the
following rule: (p. 478-479) :
"In order that a statute or ordinance may be sus-
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tained as an exercise of the police power, the
courts must be able to see (I) that the enactment
has for its object the prevention of some
or manifest evil for the preservation of the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and ( 2)
that there is some clear, real, and substantial connection between the assumed purpose of the enactment and the actual provisions thereof, and
that the latter do in some appreciable and appropriate manner tend towards the accomplishment
of the object for which the power is exercised."
The Common Day of Rest must be held invalid
under both tests. The avowed purpose of the Act is to
provide a common day of rest for the citizens of the
state. The legislature expressly recognized the importance of effecting its purpose when it stated (Section I) :
"The legislature finds that the number of such
persons or persons (sic) who would close their
businesses on Saturday in order to be open on
Sunday is small enough in this state that this exception does not impair the purposes of a uniform
day of rest."
This, respondents suggest, proved to be an erroneous assumption. But the purpose of the Act was even
more impaired by its numerous and indefinite exceptions. The breadth of these exceptions eliminate any
possibility that the Act would operate to promote the
public health, morals or safety or in accomplishing its
stated purpose. It contains so many exceptions that it
is effectively (and designedly) directed at a particular
class of business, not only entirely lawful, but essential
to the state. Most employees in the state are not affected
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by the Act, and even those who are can be denied the
common day of rest, merely by their employer staying
closed on Saturday.
Considering the Act as a whole it is clear that the
legislature acted on the theory that its powers are
plenary-an assumption clearly untenable. As stated
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539,
49 L. Ed. 934 ( 1905), and cited with approval in State
v. Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company, supra.
(p.479):

"It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact
that many of the laws of this character, while
passed under what is claimed to be the police
power for the purpose of protecting the public
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from
other motives. We are justified in saying so when,
from the character of the law and the subject
upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the
public health or welfare, bears but the most remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute
must be determined from the natural and legal
effect of the language employed; and whether it
is or is not repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States must be determined from the
natural effect of such statutes when put into operation and not from their proclaimed purpose

* * *"

v
IN ATTEMPTING TO DECLARE S01\1ETHING TO BE A NUISANCE WHICH IS NOT
ONE IN FACT, THE LEGISLATURE ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND BEYOND ITS POWERS.
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In an apparent effort to mm1m1ze constitutional
objections to the Act, the legislature provided that any
violation thereof should not be deemed a crime "but is
declared to be a public nuisance" (Section 6). In doing
so, it violated other constitutional prohibitions. This is
but a specific example of the more general requirement
that legislation must come within the police power. The
rule is generally stated in 66 C.J. S., Nuisances, §7 ( d)
as follows:
"The power of the legislature to control and regulate nuisances is not without restriction, and it
must be exercised within constitutional limitations. The power cannot be exercised arbitrarily_,
or oppressively, or unreasonably. It does not lie
within the power of the legislature to declare any
or every act a nuisance. It cannot make anything,
not in its nature a nuisance, a nuisance by mere
declaration that it is so: * * *"
Decisions from many jurisdictions support the
above rule. In Smith v .Costello, 77 Ida. 205, 290 P.2d
7 42 ( 1955), the legislature passed an act providing
that "any dog running at large in territory inhabited
by deer, is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and
may be killed at such time by any game conservation
officer * * *." The Idaho Supreme Court, in holding
the statute unconstitutional, noted that a dog was not
a nuisance per se and that territory inhabited by deer
might be construed to be any place in the state where
deer was found. It stated (p. 744):
"Governmental regulations promulgated under
police power must be consistent with the due
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process of law provision and subordinate thereto.
Police regulations cannot arbitrarily and without
any sufficient reason authorize the killing or
wounding of animals belonging to another. The
legislature cannot declare something to be a nuisance which is not one in fact or per se; and to declare that a dog running at large in territory inhabited by deer is a public nuisance, without
more, is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional regulation." [Emphasis added.}
In City of Ft. Worth v. McDonald, 293 S.W.2d
256 ( Civ. App. Tex., 1956), the Ft. Worth City Council
had passed an ordinance finding that pinball machines
encouraged idleness, loafing, vagrancy, and gambling
and declaring them to be nuisances per se. The court
holding the ordinance to be unconstitutional stated (p.
258):
"It is no better argument that the city has power
by charter and statute to define and prevent a
nuisance. It is axiomatic that no legislative body
may 'by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be
a nuisance which is not so in fact: "

Another case is First Avenue Coal & Lumber Co.
v. Johnson, 54 So. 598 (Ala., 1911), wherein the Alabama Supreme Court stated (p. 599) :
"The Legislature, therefore, cannot, by its mere
ipse dixit, make that a nuisance which is not in
fact or in truth a nuisance, or akin thereto. That
which has none of the elements or characteristics
of a nuisance, that has no capacity or tendency to
injure the public health, public morals, the public
safety, or the public interest, cannot be made a
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nuisance by the
under the guise of a
police legislation declaring it such."

1

In State v. Smith, 47 S.W.2d 642 (Ct. Civ. App.
Tex., 1932), the legislature had passed an act making
it unlawful to plant cotton on land on which cotton
had been planted the year before or to plant more than
30 % of his land in cotton. The purpose of the act was
to prevent soil erosion and the spreading of certain
cotton diseases. Violation of the act was declared to be
a public nuisance and subject to injunction by the
county attorneys of the state. The court holding the act
unconstitutional stated (p. 644-645) :
"Our courts, both federal and state, uniformly
hold that the Legislature cannot, in the guise of a
police regulation, declare that to be a nuisance
which in fact is not a nuisance***
"No contention is made that the growing of cotton
is inherently wrong or that it in any way affects
the health or morals of the state * * *
"Another principle involved in the exercise of the
police power which it is hardly necessary to state,
is that a mere legislative declaration that a business or occupation, harmless and innocuous in itself, is inimical to the public interest, either as a
whole or as to some feature of its conduct, cannot
make it so, unless by reason of surrounding conditions the declaration can be said to accord with
the fact as based upon common observation and
human experience."
See also Shepard v. Giebel, 110 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.,
1937).
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Looking at the definitions of "public nuisance",
it is obvious that, even by the broadest standards, a violation of the Common Day of Rest Act could not be
declared a "public nuisance." A good definition is given
in Commonwealth v. South Covington N.C. St. Ry.
Co., 205 S.,:V. 581, 181 Ky. 459:
"A 'common or public nuisance' is the doing of or
the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or morals, of the public,
or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public."
In People on Complaint of Green v. Willis, 17
N.Y.S.2d 784, public nuisance was defined as follows
(p. 788):
"The fundamental and commonly recognized attributes of a 'public nuisance' are the
whether at common law or by statutory regulation, 'public nuisances' being founded on wrongs
that arise from unreasonable, unwarrantable or
unlawful conduct working an obstruction or injury to the 12-ublic and producing material annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort."
Under the definition in 76-43-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, a public nuisance:

"* * * consists in unlawfully doing any act, or
omitting to perform any duty, which act or omission either: ( 1) annoys, injures or endangers the
comfort, repose, health or safety of three or more
persons; or ( 2) of fends public decency; or * * *
( 4) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property."
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Since the operation of a lawful business on Sunday
does not in any manner come under the definition of
public nuisances, as set forth above, particularly when
some stores, merely by remaining closed on Saturday,
can remain open on Sundays and all stores can remain
open for the sale of certain items, it is beyond the
power of the Utah Legislature to declare that a violation of the Act is a public nuisance. Inasmuch as this
provision of the Act is inseparable from the Act itself,
the whole Act must fall as being unconstitutional.

VI
THE COMMON DAY OF REST ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRING A BILL
TO HAVE ONLY ONE SUBJECT, CLEARLY
EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE.
The title of the Common Day of Rest Act (Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1970) is as follows:
"An Act Relating to the Establishment of Sunday as a Day of Rest; Providing for a General
Prohibition Against the Performance of Labor
or Selling on Sunday, For Exemptions from
Such Prohibition, and for Definitions and Penalties; and Repealing Sections 76-55-1, ,!6-55-2
and 76-55-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
By reason of its title the Act contravenes Article
VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution, which provides:
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"Except general appropriation bills, and bills for
the codification and general revision of laws, no
bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
The purpose of Section 23 is clearly explained in
the early Utah case of In re Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 Pac.
810 (1897) (p. 811):

"That decision [Ritchie v. Richards, 47 Pac. 670]
recognized the Constitutional provision limiting
bills to one subject and requiring it to be clearly
expressed, in the title, as a wholesome and salutary law, that should receive a reasonable interpretation and be rigidly enforced, that legislators
and the public may be informed of the purpose of
pending bills, and that surreptitious, incongruous, and inconsiderate laws may be prevented."
In Saville v. Carles, supra., this court held that the
legislature could not fix the closing hours of mercantile
houses in the body of an act where its title indicated
that it was for the purpose of regulating working hours
of employees. Such unexpressed dual purpose, the court
concluded, violated Section 23, and was therefore unconstitutional.
In Pa.ss v. Kanell, 98 Utah 511, 100 P.2d 972
(1940), this court held that in comparing the title of
an act, "The Registration of Motor Vehicles", with its
subject matter, it was demonstrated that the act violated Section 23, in that it contained a subject not
described in the title, which imposed responsibilities
upon individuals engaged in renting motor vehicles.
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And in Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah
96, 96 P.2d 727 ( 1939), the court found a statute to
be a violation of Section 23, when an examination of its
title disclosed nothing indicative of a revenue measure
to equalize gasoline tax.
The title of the present Act limits the day of rest
to Sunday, a "uniform day". However, the body of
the Act then provides that those who desire may have
the option of taking their "common" day of rest on
Saturday and remain open and operating on Sunday.
Thus, the Act does not deal with a single subject, that
is-Sunday as the common or uniform day of rest.
It in fact provides an election of either Saturday or
Sunday for such purpose. It does not provide for
general prohibition against the performance of labor
or selling on Sunday. Consequently it is in direct contravention of Article VI, Section 23.
CONCLUSION
As respondents have demonstrated, the Common
Day of Rest Act must be held invalid for a variety of
reasons.
The Act unreasonably discriminates between persons similarly situated and cannot be applied uniformly
as required by the Utah Constitution. There is no valid
basis for its unequal treatment of Utah's citizens and
businesses, the Act being at least as arbitrary as those
struck down by this court in the Broadbent and Gronlund cases.
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The attempt by the legislature to regulate without
regulating has resulted in an act the meaning of which
cannot be ascertained, and which is therefore void for
vagueness.
In one respect, the act is clear: it patently provides
a classification based upon purely religious grounds,
i.e., it includes an exception for the benefit of people
of a particular religious persuasion. This violates the
establishment clauses of the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
The classifications contained in the Act are not
only vague and ambiguous, and lack uniformity, but
the protected groups are obvious beneficiaries of specia!
legislation purportedly based upon the police power.
The Act is not written in such manner as to forward,
let alone accomplish its stated purposes. Moreover, the
bill includes a number of subjects which are not clearly
expressed in the title.
The trial court was correct in holding that the
Common Day of Rest Act is invalid in its entirety and
in dismissing the actions. The judgment should be
affirmed.
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